

Atomicity and Determinism in Boolean Systems

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Abstract

The logic of a Boolean system of finite degrees of freedom is shown to be atomic if and only if the system obeys a deterministic theory. This is, therefore, the physical meaning of atomicity. Furthermore, it is proved that nondeterminacy of such a system implies the nonexistence of phase space.

I

In this note classical mechanics is again considered as a special case of generalised physical theory defined by Kronfli (1970a). The same notation will be employed. We distinguish between a classical theory and a (classical) deterministic one. The former is one in which each pair of observables is compatible. Axiomatically, therefore, a classical system of finite degrees of freedom will necessarily have a logic \mathcal{L} which is a countably generated Boolean σ -algebra.

We define a *deterministic* system to be a classical one such that there exists a non-empty subset \mathcal{S}_0 of the set of its states \mathcal{S} where for each state in \mathcal{S}_0 at least one observable has zero variance and furthermore \mathcal{S}_0 is an invariant of the dynamical subgroup \mathcal{D} of the group $\text{Aut}(\mathcal{S})$ of convex automorphisms of \mathcal{S} . This apparently weak condition gives the full determinism of classical mechanics.

The meaning of lattice atomicity for the logic of a classical mechanical system has been obscured in the literature. This note shows that atomicity is both a necessary and sufficient condition for a Boolean system of finite degrees of freedom to be deterministic. In other words, the two are synonymous.

Unlike a countably generated σ -field of subsets of a set, an abstract countably generated Boolean σ -algebra need not be atomic. (Take, for example, the quotient of all the Borel subsets of the unit interval on the line modulo the sets of Lebesgue measure zero.) In a previous paper (Kronfli, 1970b), atomicity of the (Boolean) logic of a classical system of finite degrees of freedom, was shown to be a sufficient condition for the system to be deterministic. A Boolean system, although classical, need not be deterministic. In this paper it is shown that atomicity is also a necessary

condition. It will also be shown that without the condition of determinism, classical phase space need not even exist. The reader may compare the above-mentioned results with the objections to atomicity stated by Birkhoff & von Neumann (1936).

II

From now on \mathcal{L} is a countably generated Boolean σ -algebra (the logic of a classical system S of finite degrees of freedom), \mathcal{S} is the set of all probability measures on \mathcal{L} (the states of S) and \mathcal{P} the set of all extreme points of the convex set \mathcal{S} (the pure states of S). Our first result shows the equivalence of $\mathcal{P} \neq \emptyset$ to the atomicity of \mathcal{L} .

Proposition 1

The set \mathcal{P} is not empty if and only if \mathcal{L} is atomic. In this case $\mathcal{P} = \{q_a : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$, where \mathcal{A} is the set of atoms of \mathcal{L} and q_a is the atomic measure concentrated at the atom a .

Proof: Assume \mathcal{L} is atomic. Then clearly for each $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $q_a \in \mathcal{P}$. Thus $\mathcal{P} \neq \emptyset$. That $\{q_a : a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ equals \mathcal{P} follows from Theorem 3 of Kronfli (1970b).

Conversely, assume $\mathcal{P} \neq \emptyset$ and $p \in \mathcal{P}$. First we assert that $\text{range}(p) = \{0, 1\}$. If this is not so, then there exists $a \in \mathcal{L} \setminus \{\emptyset, 1\}$ such that $0 < p(a) < 1$. Define $p_1, p_2 \in \mathcal{S}$ by

$$\begin{aligned} p_1(x) &= (p(a))^{-1} p(x \wedge a) \\ p_2(x) &= (1 - p(a))^{-1} p(x \wedge a') \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

This gives

$$p = p(a) \cdot p_1 + (1 - p(a)) \cdot p_2$$

with $p_1 \neq p_2$, since $p_1(a) = 1$ and $p_2(a) = 0$. This is a contradiction, since p is an extreme point of the convex set \mathcal{S} . Hence, $\text{range}(p) = \{0, 1\}$. Now let $(a_n) \subset \mathcal{L}$ generate \mathcal{L} . Since $p(x)$ is either 0 or 1 for each $x \in \mathcal{L}$, we choose $b_n = a_n$ or $b_n = a_n'$ such that $p(b_n) = 1$ for all n . Clearly (b_n) generates \mathcal{L} . Put $b = \bigwedge_n b_n$. Since $p(b) = 1$ then $b \neq \emptyset$. Let

$$\mathcal{R} = \{x \in \mathcal{L} : b < x \text{ or } b < x'\}$$

Clearly, \mathcal{R} is a Boolean sub- σ -algebra of \mathcal{L} containing its generators (b_n) and, therefore, $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{L}$. But since $b \neq \emptyset$, the above result can not be possible unless b is an atom of \mathcal{L} . For, let $x \in \mathcal{L}$ and $x < b$. Since $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{L}$, then either $b < x$ or $b < x'$. The first case gives $x = b$ and the second $x = \emptyset$. Hence b is an atom.

With the assumption $\mathcal{P} \neq \emptyset$ we proved that $\mathcal{L} \neq \emptyset$. It remains to show that \mathcal{L} is atomic, i.e. each non-zero element of \mathcal{L} dominates at least one atom. Let, therefore $\Omega, \Omega_c, \mathcal{B}(\Omega), \varphi$ and γ be as in Theorems 1 and 2 of Kronfli (1970b). Since φ maps $\mathcal{B}(\Omega)$ onto \mathcal{L} , then for each non-zero and

non-atomic element $a \in \mathcal{L}$ there exists $A \in \mathcal{B}(\Omega)$, which is not a singleton, since γ is a bijection on Ω_c onto \mathcal{A} , with $A \cap \Omega_c \neq \emptyset$ and $\varphi(A) = a$. (It is easy to see that this corollary to Theorem 2 holds simply with the assumption $\mathcal{A} \neq \emptyset$.) Let $x \in A \cap \Omega_c$. Then $\gamma(x)$ is an atom and $\gamma(x) < a$. This completes the proof. ■

Using the definition of determinism given in the first section, we show that determinism and atomicity of the logic are equivalent. The obvious candidate for \mathcal{S}_0 is \mathcal{P} .

Proposition 2

The countably generated Boolean σ -algebra \mathcal{L} is the logic of a deterministic system if and only if \mathcal{L} is atomic.

Proof: Let $p \in \mathcal{S}$ and u be an observable whose variance in p is zero. Let τ be its expectation value,

$$\int_R t p \circ u(dt)$$

which is necessarily finite. Then

$$\int_R (t - \tau)^2 p \circ u(dt) = 0$$

Hence the function $t \rightarrow (t - \tau)^2$ on $R \rightarrow R$ is zero ($p \circ u$) almost everywhere. This is possible only if $p \circ u$ is an atomic measure concentrated at τ . Put $a = u(\{\tau\})$. Then a is either \emptyset or an atom of \mathcal{L} . But $p(a) = 1$, and hence a is an atom and $p = q_a \in \mathcal{P}$. Thus \mathcal{P} is not empty and by Proposition 1 \mathcal{L} is atomic. Thus at least $\mathcal{S}_0 \subset \mathcal{P}$. Also, each element of $\text{Aut}(\mathcal{S})$, and hence of the dynamical group \mathcal{D} , is a bijection of \mathcal{P} onto itself. Therefore determinism implies the atomicity of \mathcal{L} .

Conversely, atomicity of \mathcal{L} implies that the theory of the system is deterministic as was shown in Kronfli (1970b). ■

Corollary

Let \mathcal{L} be the logic of a Boolean system S of finite degrees of freedom. Then the phase space of S does not exist if S is non-deterministic.

Proof: Assume S is non-deterministic with non-empty phase space. Since phase space is equipotent to \mathcal{P} (Kronfli, 1970b), then \mathcal{P} is not empty. From Propositions 1 and 2, S is deterministic, which is a contradiction. ■

References

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